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Bankruptcy--Right of SEC to Intervene in Chapter XI Pro-
ceeding by Corporation with Publicly-Held Securities-Debtor
sought under Chapter XI to obtain an extension and modification of one
class of its unsecured obligations consisting of its guaranty of almost four
million dollars' worth of publicly-held mortgage certificates.- The Securities
and Exchange Commission 2 contended that debtor had to seek reorganiza-
tion under Chapter X and not an arrangement under Chapter XI because
of its large amounts of publicly-held securities.8 The District Court granted
the SEC leave to intervene to contest jurisdiction but held that debtor had
properly filed under Chapter XI and referred the proceeding to a referee.
Held (one judge dissenting), the order permitting intervention was erro-
neous and consequently the SEC's appeal is dismissed. In re United States
Realty & Improvement Co., io8 F. (2d) 794 (C. C. A. 2d, i94o) 4 cert.
granted 8 U. S. L. WEEK 577.
Although the debtor came within the literal requirements of Chapter
XI, the technical interpretation by the majority of the court results in an
unfortunate emasculation of the Chandler Act.5 The court's view also
demonstrates the anomaly resulting from incorporating the reorganization
sections of the law with those concerning liquidation since, by relying on the
definition of who may become a bankrupt,6 the court failed to effectuate the
undoubted legislative intent that Chapter X be used for the reorganization
of large corporations while Chapter XI be reserved for the rehabilitation
through composition of smaller enterprises having slight public-investor
interest.7 The Act seems clearly to need amendment to remove its ambigu-
ities and vagueness in this respect.8 But while it may be admitted that in
some instances a composition by a corporation of one class of its unsecured
indebtedness will be more advantageous than a thoroughgoing reorganization
under Chapter X, the financial situation of the debtor in the instant case
should have led the court to dismiss the Chapter XI proceeding.9 This
i. Over goo individual investors held these share certificates. Instant case at 799.
2. Hereinafter referred to as "SEC". The SEC first appeared as amicus curiae
but was subsequently granted leave to intervene by the District Court.
3. The corporation's deficit is $i8,ooo,ooo, its assets are $7,o76,515, its liabilities
are $5,551,416 excluding the obligation here sought to be modified. Public investors
also hold other debenture issues of the corporation and gooooo shares of stock are out-
standing. This stock is listed and traded in on the New York Stock Exchange. In-
stant case at 799.
4. Three days after the Circuit Court's decision, the District Court in Maryland
announced a similar decision. it re Credit Service, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 878 (1940). In
this case the debtor, a holding corporation, sought to exchange the preferred stock of
a subsidiary for its own outstanding debentures. Although the SEC was again denied
leave to intervene, Judge Chesnut repeatedly invited it to appear as amicus curae.
5. For a lengthy discussion of the general problem see Rostow and Cutler, Com-
peting Systems of Corporate Rearganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy
Act (1939) 48 YALn L. J. 1334. See also Jackson, The Need for Amendment of the
Chandler Act (1939) A3 CoRP. REORG. AND Amr. BANxR. REV. 35.
6. Section 306 (i) of Chapter XI provides that an arrangement shall mean any
plan of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction, or extension of the time of payment of
his unsecured debts, upon any terms. Section 306 (3) defines debtor as a person who
could become a bankrupt under § 4 of the Act.
7. See note 5 supra.
8. Ibid.
9. Judge Clark points out that the debtor was insolvent and indicates that the ar-
rangement will be merely "a temporary paliative for an incurable financial disease."
Instant case at 79g, 8ol. See also In re Reo Motor Car Co., 30 F. Supp. 785 (939).
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result could easily have been reached by a reliance on the equitable principles
underlying all these proceedings and, more specifically, the general require-
ments of fairness, equity and feasibility. 10 In holding that these matters
were unrelated to jurisdiction,11 the majority reached a result that opens a
hole in the Chandler Act through which great corporations may escape from
the long-sought judicial and administrative safeguards of Chapter X.
12
Even granting, however, that the position of the court necessarily followed
from the language of the Act, the effects of the decision could have been
mitigated by allowing the SEC to intervene, if not as a matter of right 13
then within the discretionary power of the court under Rule 24 (b) (2) of
the Federal Rules.' 4 By so doing the SEC would have been enabled to meet
its "important public responsibility" 15 and some measure of protection
would thereby be afforded public security holders in proceedings under
Chapter XI.
Bills and Notes-Availability of Surety Defenses to Accommoda-
tion Parties Under the Negotiable Instruments Law-Defendant bank
accepted plaintiff's note payable to a third person as collateral security for
a loan made by the bank to the third person. Later the bank learned that
plaintiff had made the note for the third party's accommodation only, and
notwithstanding extended the maturity date of the loan to the third person
without plaintiff's consent. Plaintiff then sought to cancel the note which
defendant bank still retained as securty. Held (one justice dissenting), that
plaintiff was merely an accommodation party in fact, that the surety defense
of extension of time released plaintiff's obligation, and that the note should
be cancelled. Hederman v. Cox, 193 So. 19 (Miss. 194o).
Prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the surety,
though primarily liable by the terms of the instrument, was discharged by
extension of time to the party who was in fact the principal debtor almost
universally where the holder knew of the surety relation when he became
the holder,1 and by the weight of authority where the holder took the instru-
ment in ignorance of the surety relation, but became aware of it before
granting the extension.2 However, a majority of jurisdictions have held
that adoption of the N. I. L. has changed the rule in both instances. 3 It is
io. See FINLETrER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION (1939) pp. 61-62,
69-7O, 85; Note (940) 17 N. Y. U. L. Q. 254.
I I. Instant case at 797.
12. The figure of speech is used by Judge Clark in his dissent. Instant case at 799.
13. The majority of the court held that the SEC had no special interest to protect
and could not, therefore, intervene. Instant case at 798.
14. This is the position of Judge Clark, who criticizes the majority for considering
only the absolute right of intervention. Instant case at 8or. Judge Chesnut, on the
other hand, expressly held that the SEC could not intervene either as a matter of right
or permissively. His ground for denying permissive intervention was that such inter-
vention would be "merely for the purpose of appealing from the refusal of the motion
to dismiss." In, re Credit Service, Inc., 3o F. Supp. 878, 88o (194o). This decision,
however, overlooks the fact that when intervention is granted under the Federal Rules
the SEC's right to appeal would be as broad as that of any party. See Note (940) 49
YALE L. J. 927, 936.
15. Instant case at 8oi.
I. Hening, The Uniforn Negotiable Instronents Law, Is It Producing Uniformity
and Certainty in the Law Merchant? (911) 59 U. OF PA. L. REv. 532, and exhaustive
citation of authorities therein; 4 WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 1259.
2. Authorities cited note I supra.
3. The cases are collected in Notes (1927) 48 A. L. R. 7,5, (93O) 65 A. L. R.
1425; and in BEUTEL, BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (6th ed. 1938) 969.
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argued that inasmuch as the surety 4 or accommodation co-maker 5 is pri-
marily liable under the N. I. L.6 and since the five methods of discharge of
a negotiable instrument provided for in section 119 of the N. I. L. are con-
sidered to be the only methods of discharging one primarily liable 7 and do
not include discharge for extension of time, the accommodating party cannot
be discharged by an extension of time to the principal debtor in fact.8 On
the other hand, a minority of jurisdictions 1 and numerous commentators 10
have strongly criticized this approach. It is said that to consider section 119
of the N. I. L. as exclusive is erroneous and in plain derogation of section
196.11 Any case not provided for is to be governed by the law merchant,
12
and the law merchant should be considered to include the rules of surety-
ship.'3 It might also be well argued that clause 4 of section 119, which
provides for discharge by any act which will discharge a simple contract for
the payment of money, encompasses the instant situation and should operate
to admit surety defenses.' 4 Under any construction, where the holder is
not a holder in due course, section 58 of the N. I. L.15 should apply to admit
defenses available where the instrument is non-negotiable and thus admit
surety defenses.-" Conversely, surety defenses should not be available to
defeat the rights of a holder in due course who had no knowledge of the
surety relation,17 the policy of the N. I. L. to protect innocent holders out-
weighing the policy of protecting gratuitous sureties. Where the holder
in due course becomes acquainted with the surety relation after negotiation
to him, but before commission of the act alleged to be a discharge, the situ-
ation of the instant case, the holder nevertheless accepted the instrument
4. Fritts v. Kirchdorfer, 136 Ky. 643, 124 S. W. 882 (igio) ; Rouse v. Wooten,
140 N. C. 557, 53 S. E. 43o (igo6).
5. German American State Bank v. Watson, 99 Kan. 686, 163 Pac. 637 (1917);
First State Bank v. Williams, 164 Ky. 143, 175 S. W. 1o (1915); Jamesson v. Citi-
zens Nat. Bank, 130 Md. 75, 99 Atl. 994 (1917) ; Murphy v. Panter, 62 Ore. 522, 125
Pac. 292 (1912).
6. NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW §§ 6o, 192.
7. Smith v. Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co., 89 Okla. 156, 159, 214 Pac. 178,
i8o (1923) ; Citizens Bank v. Knudson, 120 Ore. 493, 500, 252 Pac. 969, 972 (1927).
At least, inclusion of discharge by extension of time in the case of those "secondarily"
liable (NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 120) .and omission in the case of those
"primarily" liable (NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 119; discharge of instrument
necessarily discharging those primarily liable) infers that this particular defense was
not intended to discharge an accommodation maker. Cowan v. Ramsey, 15 Ariz. 533,
537, 140 Pac. 5Ol, 5o3 (1914) ; Hall v. Farmers Bank, 74 Colo. 165, 170, 220 Pac. 237,
239 (1923) ; Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 207, 98 N. E. 679, 68o (1912).
8. Authority cited notes 3, 4, 5 and 7 supra.
9. Cases are collected in Notes (1927) 48 A. L. R. 715, 725, (193o) 65 A. L. R.
1425, 1426; and in BEuTEL, Op. cit. SUpra note 3, at 973.
10. 4 WIlSTON, op. cit. supra note i, at § 126o; BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW (2d ed. 1911) 117; Hening, loc. cit. supra note I; McMahon, Sureties Un-
der the Negotiable Instruments Law (igio) 8 O io L. REP. 25; Ames, The Negotiable
Inatruments Law (i9oo) 14 HARv. L. REv. 241; (1928) 6 NEB. L. BULL. 417.
ii. Greely, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law in the Light of Recent
Critics (1915) io ILL. L. REV. 265, 279; BRANNAN, loc. cit. supra note io.
12. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 196.
13. Raymond, Suretyship at "Law Merchant" (1916) 30 HARv. L. RE. 4; Note
(1925) 38 HAmv. L. Pv. 95; (1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 136.
14. BEUTL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 973; T. A. S., Effect of Negotiable Instru-
wents Law on Liability of the Surely (1907) 11 L. NoTES 105.
15. Providing that "In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due course,
a negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable."
16. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Snouffer, 139 Ia. 176, 117 N. W. 50 (19o8) ; collection
of cases cited supra note 9.
17. Under § 57 of Negotiable Instruments Law which provides that a holder in
due course holds the instrument free from defenses available to prior parties; and under
§ 6o which provides that original parties agree to pay the instrument "according to its
tenor".
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under the impression that no defenses, surety or otherwise, were available
to defeat his rights, and the policy of protecting innocent holders should
again prevail.' 8 As indicated, 19 the majority of decisions reach this result,
however diverse their means of reaching that result may be, and the contrary
decision of the instant court cannot, therefore, be reconciled with the pre-
vailing precedent. In any event, the desired uniformity which the N. I. L.
was designed to effect has not been accomplished in this respect,20 and
either repeal 21 or amendment 22 of section 119 seems to be the only available
solution.
23
Bills and Notes-Liability of Accommodation Maker to Receiver
of Accommodated Bank-In violation of a federal statute,' the bank
of which plaintiff is the receiver purchased shares of its own stock. To cover
up the illegal purchase, the defendant, a director of the bank, executed an
accommodation note for the value of the stock held by the bank, and put the
shares in another's name.2  On failure of the accommodated bank, its re-
ceiver sues to recover the amount of the note.' Held (Justices Roberts and
McReynolds dissenting), the accommodation party is "estopped" to avoid
liability upon the illegality of his contract with the bank. Deitrick v.
Greaney, 6o Sup. Ct. 480 (1940).
Reconciliation of the legal dogmas offered to hold the maker of an
accommodation instrument liable to the receiver of a bank which has used
it as a fictitious asset is almost impossible. Broadly speaking, liability has
been predicated on the grounds of estoppel 4 and consideration where the
I8. § I19 (4), which provides for discharge by any act which will discharge asimple contract for the payment of money, is apparently in conflict with this statementand the preceding one. The conflict may be explained, .however, by considering anegotiable instrument and its transfers as an aggregate of contracts, and the suretydefenses as not available (under § 57, supra note 17) where the party to the contractof negotiation is a holder in due course, however available it is where the basic con-
tract is involved. BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 974.
19. See note 3 supra.
20. Despite frequent assertions in the decisions that conformity is the norm andthat decisions of other jurisdictions should be followed irrespective of the court's owndesire. Apparently, such statements are only made when the majority view of other
states accords with the view of the present court.
21. Advocated by Hening, .upra note I, at 542.
22. Advocated by Brannan, Some Necessary Amendments of the Negotiable Istrt-
ments Law (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 588, 593-596.
23. However, repeal of the sections would leave the Act silent on a very importantaspect of the law. Also, amendment to include surety defenses generally would notresult in complete conformity because surety laws differ in the different states, and aninclusive list of surety defenses would seem to be impossible.
I. 13 STAT. 1o (1864), 12 U. S. C. A. § 83 (1936). "No association shall makeany loan or discount on the security of the shares of its own capital stock, nor be thepurchaser or holder of any such shares, unless such security or purchase shall be neces-sary to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in good faith. . . ." The bankin the instant case acquired the stock upon the threat of one of its directors to sell in
the open market.
2. The defendant's note had been substituted for that of another given for the same
purpose. Deitrick v. Greaney, 23 F. Supp. 758 (D. Mass. 1938). As to the defendant's
liability for the assessment on the shares, see note 3 infra.3. The receiver had already been permitted to recover the assessment on the stocktaken by the defendant, in both of the lower court opinions. 23 F. Supp. 758 (D. Mass.1938) ; 103 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. ist, 1939). And this was held despite the fact thatthe defendant had registered the shares in another's name. This is in accord with thegeneral rule. 7 MIClrlE, BANKS AND BANKING (1932) 58; 2 MoRSE, BANKS AND
BANKING (6th ed. 1928) 1414.
4. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Crothers, 289 Fed. 777 (C. C. A. 4th,1923); Pauly v. O'Brien, 69 Fed. 46o (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1895) ; Niblack v. Farley, 286
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defendant is in a position to "benefit" by the bank's avoiding liability under
the statute; - while contrary decisions have rested on the theory that the
receiver succeeds to the relation of the insolvent bank to the maker.6 Be-
cause of the conflict of judicial logic,7 apparently the true determinatives of
the results achieved are the policies adopted by the various courts. Thus,
the receiver has been denied recovery because of judicial reluctance to
enforce illegal contracts." But since non-liability on the note was the sub-
stance of the defendant's agreement with the bank, denying recovery in the
instant case would, practically, be giving effect to the illegal contract, so
that adoption of this policy could hardly be said to lead to a desirable result.
Furthermore, as the instant court points out, the statute involved was
designed for the protection of creditors, and to deny recovery would be to
allow circumvention of the statute, so as to injure the creditors' interests.9
Thus, it appears that such a consideration of the purpose of the statute is
preferable to a refusal to aid either party. It is submitted, however, that this
liability should be imposed on the accommodation party only in a situation
such as that present in the instant case, where the defendant was aware of
the illegal purpose for which his note was to be used,10 and not, as has been
held, where the note is given in good faith. While the interests of the cred-
Ill. 536, 122 N. E. i6o (igig), 28 YALE L. J. 822; Golden v. Cervenka, 278 Ill. 409, I16
N. E. 273 (1917) ; German-American Finance Corp. v. Merchants' & Manufacturers'
State Bank, 177 Minn. 529, 225 N. W. 89I (1929), 64 A. L. R. 582; State Bank of
Pittsburgh v. Kirk, 216 Pa. 452, 65 Ati. 932 (1907). See other cases in BRANNAN,
NEGOTIARLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (6th ed. 1938) 458-46o.
Note, however, it is difficult to find all the elements of estoppel in the various cases
holding this theory. See the criticism in Note (1924) 38 HARv. L. REV. 239, 242. This
difficulty is recognized by Stone, J., in the instant opinion, " . . the doctrine with
which we are now concerned is not strictly that of estoppel ... " Instant case at 484.
5. "Consideration" is usually found when the accommodation party is a shareholder,
or, as in the instant case, a director of the accommodated bank. Bohning v. Caldwell,
io F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926); Brookly v. Sullivan, 214 N. Y. 332, io8 N. E.
558 (1915). As in the case of the "estoppel" doctrine, note 4 supra, the application of
the word "consideraation" in these cases is not strictly within the classic definition of
that term. BRANNAN, op. cit supra note 4, at 454; Note (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 239,
240.
A variety of other reasons has been offered by the courts holding the accommoda-
tion party liable. For example, proof of the agreement of the bank not to sue on the
note has been excluded under the parole evidence rule. Id. at 241. See also collection
of cases in notes 64 A. L. R. 595 (1929), 95 A. L. R. 984 (1935).
6. This has been a principle of long standing in the instant court. Rankin v. City
Nat. Bank, 208 U. S. 541, 546 (19o8). It was most recently affirmed in a dictum in
Deitrick v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co., 303 U. S. 471, 480 (1938), 86 U. OF PA.
L. Ray. 895. See also Andresen v. Kaercher, 38 F. (2d) 462 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930) ;
Cutler v. Fry, 24o Fed. 238 (D. Kan. 1915); cf. Hookway v. First Nat. Bank, 36 F.
(2d) 166 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). The dissenting opinion in the instant case was based
on this rule. Id. at 486.
Upon the view that the receiver represents the creditors, it is difficult to see why
the receiver could not have greater rights than the insolvent bank. But see 2 CLARK,
RECEiVERs (2d ed. 1929) § 894.
7. In the instant case the defendant could have been held liable under the estoppel
or consideration doctrines, notes 4 and 5 supra. But could be relieved from liability
under the doctrine stated in note 6 supra.
8. Yates Center Nat. Bank v. Lauber, 24o Fed. 237 (D. Kan. 1915) ; Hookway v.
First Nat. Bank, 36 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). RESTA EmENT, CONmRcTS
(1932) § 598; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 163o.
9. "The obvious purpose of prohibiting the purchase by a bank of its own stock is
to prevent the impairment of its capital resources and the consequent injury to its cred-
itors in the event of insolvency." Instant case, at 482.
IO. The defendant was well aware of the fact that the note was to conceal the
stock purchase, as he had procured the note for which his own had been sustituted. Id.
at 483.
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itors must be protected, this object does not warrant placing hardship on
one wholly innocent of even endangering those interests. 1
Conflict of Laws-Foreign Statute of Limitations-Action was
brought in Delaware against a resident of that state who was a stockholder
of an insolvent New York bank. The six-year limitation embodied in the
New York statute I conferring the cause of action had not expired, but a
Delaware statute 2 provided that no action of case could be brought after
three years, which here had elapsed. Held, demurrer to defendant's plea of
the Delaware limitation overruled, the cause of action being barred by the
law of the forum; to hold otherwise would subordinate the public policy of
Delaware to that of New York. White v. Govatos, io A. (2d) 524 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1939).
At the outset the instant court was confronted with a division of
authority on the precise point to be decided." Since most states by statute 4
will borrow the foreign limitation, if shorter, to bar the claim,, it seems to
follow that they will not apply it if longer,6 since their policy is to outlaw
all foreign claims as soon as possible. 7  In addition the instant case and
ii. There is no definite indication that the instant court would hold the defendant
liable if he had acted in good faith. However, it has been held that the good faith of
the maker does not avoid liability. Iglehart v. Todd, 203 Ind. 427, 178 N. E. 685
(931), (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 926. But see Hudson Bank v. Richardson, 128 Kan.
238, 276 Pac. 815 (1929) ; Shaw v. Korth, 71 S. W. (2d) 332 (Tex. App. 1934);
Browning v. Fuller, 153 Va. 36, 149 S. E. 462 (1929).
I. N. Y. BANKING LAW ANN. § I13-a (4 McKinney, 1937). Section II3-a, which
creates the right, also conditions it with the six-year limitation. Such a liability is un-
known to the common law and exists only by virtue of statute. See Brunswick Termi-
nal Co. v. Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 99 Fed. 635, 639 (C. C. A. 4th, 19oo).
2. REv. CODE DEL. (1935) § 5129. This section embodies a general statute of lim-
itations covering replevin, trespass, case, debt, etc.
3. See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) 204. Most of the cases pre-
senting this problem involve wrongful death statutes or stockholder's liability statutes.
The following are in accord with the holding of the instant case: Continental Ill. Nat.
Bank v. Holmes, 21 F. Supp. 309 (M. D. Pa. 1937), (1938) 4 U. OF PIr. L. REv. 215;
Wright v. Kroydon Co., 9 N. J. Misc. 287, 154 Atl. 195 (ig3i); Tieffenbrun v. Flan-
nery, 198 N. C. 397, 15, S. E. 857 (193o) ; Rosenzweig v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 Atl.
346 (1931). Cf. Platt v. Wilmot, 193 U. S. 602 (1904); Hutchings v. Lamson, 96
Fed. 720 (C. C. A. 7th, 1899). See also Note 0935) 21 ST. Louis L. REv. 43, 46.
Contra: The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199 (1886); Keep v. National Tube Co., I54 Fed.
121 (C. C. D. N. J. 1907); Brunswick Terminal Co. v. Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 99
Fed. 635 (C. C. A. 4th, 19oo) ; Theroux v. Northern Pacific Ry., 64 Fed. 84 (C. C. A.
8th, 1894); Coffman v. Wood, 5 F. Supp. 906 (N. D. Ill. 1934); Negaubauer v. Great
Northern Ry., 92 Minn. 184, 99 N. W. 62o (194o).
Normally, where the limitation is not a condition of the right, the lex fori will
govern as a matter of procedure. See Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of
Laws (1932) 31 MICH. L. REV. 474, and Legis. (1935) 35 COL. L. REV. 762.
4. These are the so-called "borrowing" statutes. See Note (935) 35 COL. L. REv.
762, 764. For a sample statute see PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 39.
5. Pattridge v. Palmer, 2O Minn. 387, 277 N. W. 18 (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV.
663. See Mister v. Burkholder, 56 Pa. Super. 517, 520 (1914). See also RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 605.
6. At least two textwriters seemingly lean toward this view, and indicate that the
lex fori should bar the action, without, however, destroying the right. See GOODRICH,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 204, and 2 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1905) 1264.
But see Dean Goodrich's qualification in note 9 infra. Apparently the result is that
the plaintiff is left with an empty right, since the defendant will not become amenable
unless he is perchance found in New York, which is extremely unlikely. See Note
(1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1112, 1117.
7. See Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1112. To prevent the bringing of stale
claims is of course one of the main reasons for the existence of any statute of limita-
tions.
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others in accord have pointed out that to apply the lex loci would give non-
residents more rights in local courts than residents 8 and would also be
contrary to local public policy 9 as manifested in a similar statute of limitation
as to the time within which such actions should be brought. But it seems
doubtful whether the foregoing arguments should apply where, as here, the
statute conferring the right also embodies in it the limitation,0 and the
right itself is one unknown to the common law. In such a case the matter
of limitation appears to be substantive "1 rather than procedural. Unlike
New York, Delaware has no particular statute of this type, but simply one
limiting all "actions on the case". 12 It is impossible therefore to say defi-
nitely what Delaware's public policy concerning this particular type of action
may be. The action was brought in Delaware probably because that was
the only place where jurisdiction could be had over the defendant, and it is
meaningless to conclude that the right still persists if the remedy be curtailed
by the law obtaining there.13 As a matter of comity,14 it would seem more
just, and would apparently not involve any difficulty of administration, to
give effect to the lex loci in all cases where the limitation is so essentially a
8. See Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N. C. 397, 404, i5r S. E. 857, 861 (1930), and
also (1938) 4 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 215, 218. But this argument seems faulty in part,
for if the lex fori prevails it would undoubtedly also apply to residents suing on the
foreign statute. See 3 BEALE, CONFLICT or LAWS (935) 1629, and critical comment
in Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1112, 1117.
9. As to the public policy point, cf. Keep v. National Tube Co., 154 Fed. 121, 127
(C. C. D. N. J. 1907) ; Theroux v. Northern Pacific Ry., 64 Fed. 84, 86 (C. C. A. 8th,
1894) ; Louisville & N. R. R. v. Burkhart, 154 Ky. 92, 96, I57 S. W. 18, I9 (1913) ;
Negaubauer v. Great Northern Ry., 92 Minn. 184, 186, 99 N. W. 62o, 621 (19o4). See
also GoomicH, op. cit. mipra note 3, at 204, where the position is taken that although
the right is not gone till extinguished by the statute creating it, the statute of the forum
shows the local policy as to the time for suing, and "It could well be interpreted as lim-
miting locally created rights, and as setting up a procedural bar to all actions of this
type no matter where arising." Note, however, that this explanation is made only
"where the les fori creates a cause of action under similar circumstances" (italics sup-
plied). It seems that in the instant case the local statute does not so create the cause
of action. But the instant court at 529 refused to subordinate the public policy of the
forum in the name of comity.
Possibly there is a different public policy involved in-the wrongful death statute
cases and the stock assessment cases. It is probable that there is a greater judicial
feeling against allowing recovery in the stock cases where the local limitation has
already run, since most courts in any event are disinclined to allow recovery against
stockholders, where the loss in most cases is due to the fault of the directors, now judg-
ment proof.
io. See Brunswick Terminal Co. v. Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 99 Fed. 635, 639 (C.
C. A. 4th, igoo) ; Moran v. Harrison, 91 F. (2d) 310, 312 (App. D. C. 1937). Cf.
Boyd v. Clark, 8 Fed. 849 (C. C. E. D. Mich. I88I). See also STUMBERG, CONFLICr OF
LAWs (1937) 143; Legis. (1935) 35 COL. L. REV. 762; Note (93) 79 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 1112 (in which holdings similar to that in the instant case are criticized).
ii. See Hutchinson v. Ward, 192 N. Y. 375, 85 N. E. 390 (19o8). See also Note
1938) io RocKY MT. L. REv. 128, stating that where a statute creates a right and in
e same enactment provides for the time within which suit is to be brought, the time
so fixed becomes a limitation on the right of action.and will.control no matter where
suit is brought. As to time limitation being a matter of substance, see SrumBama, op.
cit. supra note IO, at 141.
12. See note 2 supra.
13. See note 6 supra.
14. See Keep v. National Tube Co., 154 Fed. 121 (C. C. D. N. J. 1907), at 126:
"The trend of judicial opinion is toward the establishment of a liberal rule of interstate
comity in the enforcement of rights of action created by state statutes, whether they be
rights ex contractu or ex delicto." See also Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Burkhart, 154
Ky. 92, 96, 157 S. W. 18, 19 (1913); Theroux v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 64 Fed. 84,
86 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894). For the meaning of "comity", see GOODRIcr, op. cit. mtpra
note 3, at 8.
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part of the right conferred, whether or not a local statute of limitation has
expired.15 Such a result seems even more justifiable where the local policy
has not been manifested in any similar statute.16 As a general rule it has
further been suggested that "the lex loci should be applied in those instances
where the result is so materially affected by the difference in the rule as to
outweigh the inconvenience, if any, in departing from the procedural law of
the forum".' 7
Divorce-Power to Modify Alimony Decree-Husband was
granted an absolute divorce upon the fault of the wife. Wife was granted
a lump sum of $i5,ooo as alimony, payable in monthly installments of $250.
After paying the installments for some time, the husband filed application
to modify the judgment by vacating it as to future installments because of
the remarriage of the wife to another man financially able to support her.
Held (four justices dissenting), that since the alimony award was of a
definite sum of money, it was a final judgment and could not be modified.
Gilcrease v. Gilcrease, 98 P. (2d) 906 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 194o).
The rule which permits a change in the terms of the alimony decree
to conform to new circumstances is derived from the ecclesiastical courts,
which restricted it to cases of limited divorce, on the ground that the amount
of alimony was not absolutely final, but that the adjudication was a contin-
uing one.' On the other hand, where an absolute divorce has been granted,
it is generally held that the power to alter a decree after it has been made
does not exist in the absence of the reservation of such power in the decree
itself or of statutory authority.2 This rule seems to proceed on the theory
that the decree is res adjudicata as to alimony.3 Under the Oklahoma
statute, permanent alimony must be awarded either in specific property or
in a definite sum of money. 4 Once the decree meets these requirements it
is considered a final judgment and not subject to modification.5 Thus,
where the alimony award has been merely for payment of monthly install-
ments, with no lump sum having been decreed, modification has been
granted.6 Although the statute does not provide for alimony to a guilty
15. This was the broad rule laid down in Boyd v. Clark, 8 Fed. 849, 852 (C. C. E.
D. Mich. 1881), although the actual decision turned on the fact that the shorter foreign
limitation had already expired. Cf. Negaubauer v, Great Northern Ry., 92 Minn. 184,
99 N. W. 620 (1904). See also (938) IO RocKY MT. L. REV. 128, pointing out that
in enforcing a liability not existing at common law and arising only by statute, both
right and remedy are involved, and resort can be had only to the statute of creation to
determine the problem.
16. See GooDRIcH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 204, and note 9 supra.
17. See Note (931) 79 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 1117. See also Note (1935) 45 YALE
L. J. 339, 346: "If the subject matter covered by a statute falls peculiarly Within the
regulatory power of the enacting state, its interest outweighs the interest of other states
so decisively that the policy of any other state is held to be immaterial."
I. Alexander v. Alexander, 13 App. D. C. 334 (1898) ; Emerson v. Emerson, 120
Md. 584, 87 Atl. 1033 (1913) ; Francis v. Francis, 192 Mo. App. 71G, 179 S. W. 975
(915) ; 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (932) § 107; Desvernine, Grounds for
the Modification of Alimony Awards (1939) 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 236; i VA. L.
REv. 513 (1933).
2. Emerson v. Emerson, 22o Md. 584, 87 Atl. 1033 (1913) ; 2 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE,
DIvORcE, SEPARATION, AND DomFSTIc RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) § 1828.
3. 2 VERNIE, op. cit. sUpra note I, § io6.
4. Finley v. Finley, x74 Okla. 457, 50 P. (2d) 643 (1935) ; Flaxman v. Flaxman,
169 Okla. 65, 35 P. (2d) 950 (934) ; I OKLA. STAT. (1931) § 672.
5. Bowen v. Bowen, 282 Okla. 114, 76 P. (2d) 90o (1938).
6. Finley v. Finley, 174 Okla. 457, 50 P. (2d) 643 (1935) ; Bussey v. Bussey, 148
Okla. IO, 296 Pac. 4Ol (i93i) ; Dutton v. Dutton, 97 Okla. 234, 223 Pac. 149 (1924).
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wife, the court, in a previous case, granted alimony to such a -wife, in order
that she might not be left destitute.7 Since there is no statutory authority
for such an award, it seems clearly to be an exercise of the equity powers of
the court,8 and as such should not necessarily be subject to the same rules
as awards made under the statute," but rather to equitable principles in the
light of changed circumstances. The statute being silent as to the effect of
the wife's guilt, the better result would have been to apply the rule of the
old ecclesiastical courts 10 and to allow modification of the decree. Although
same thirty-one states, by statute, permit revision of alimony decrees, it is
submitted that such power should be granted even in the absence of statu-
tory authority. Since the basis of alimony lies in the duty of the husband
to support the wife, it should be subject to change according to the needs
of the wife as affected by her remarriage or in the ability of her husband to
pay. The doctrine of res adjudicata as to alimony, propounded by the
majority of jurisdictions, while perhaps applicable at the time the decree
is made, does not necessarily apply in the light of changed circumstances.
"The duty of support which a husband owes to his wife is not such as to
be crystallized by the circumstances of the moment". 1
Labor Law-Courts of Competent Jurisdiction in Suits for Back
Wages under Wages and Hours Law-Employee sued in state court
for back wages and an equal additional amount under § 16 (b) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act I which provides for suit in "any court of competent
jurisdiction". Held, action dismissed, since the suit is to enforce payment
of a penalty incurred under a federal statute of which the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction under the Judicial Code.2 Anderson v. Meacham,
8 U. S. L. WEEK 437 (Ga. Ct. App. I94O).
Contra: Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 8 U. S. L. WEEK
437 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 194o) (state court has jurisdiction; employee is not
required to bring suit in federal court on the theory that it is a suit to
enforce payment of a penalty 3).
7. Flaxman v. Flaxman, 177 Okla. 28, 57 P. (2d) 81q (936).
8. See note 7 mtpra.
9. It was on the basis of this reasoning and general equitable principles that the
dissent maintained their position.
1o. 2 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note i, § lO5.
II. 2 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note I, at 275.
I. 52 STAT. io6o (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §§2o1-219 (Cum. Supp. 1939). For gen-
eral discussion see Notes (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 91, (939) 52 HAV. L. Ray.
646; Symposium (939) 6 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 323-490.
Section 16 (b) provides as follows: "Any employer who violates the provisions of
section 6 or section 7 of this chapter shall be liable to'the employee or employees af-
fected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages . . . and in an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in
any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such employee or em-
ployees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in
behalf of all employees similarly situated. The court in such action shall, in addition
to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee
to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action."
2. 36 STAT. ii6o-ii61 (I911), 28 U. S. C. A. §37I (2) (1934).
3. The court said further that the state court has jurisdiction even if the suit does
involve a penalty within the meaning of the Judicial Code, in view of the provision of
the Act providing for the institution of suits "in any court of competent jurisdiction".
The question of jurisdiction, it contended, is governed by such provision of the Act, and
not by the provision of the Judicial Code.
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Plaintiff brought a similar suit in a federal court for himself and "all
other employees similarly situated", as provided in § I6 (b), the amount
claimed by himself being less than $3ooo. Held, that the court has no
jurisdiction. The action cannot be sustained on the penalty theory as
§ 16 (b) is providing for liquidated damages, not a penalty; and the amount
claimed is insufficient to confer jurisdiction since the amount considered is
that claimed by the nominal plaintiff, not the aggregate amount of the claims
of all the employees similarly situated. Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills,
Inc., 8 U. S. L. WEEK 437 (E. D. Tenn. i94o).
Contra: Quinones v. Central Igualdad, Inc., 8 U. S. L. WEEK 437(D. Puerto Rico 194o) (federal court has jurisdiction though none of the
employees claims $3000, since the action arises under a statute regulating
interstate commerce).
By enacting that suits under the Wages and Hours Law could be
brought in "any court of competent jurisdiction", the obvious legislative
intent would seem to be to confer concurrent jurisdiction; 4 thus these
decisions are surprising in their inconsistent interpretations-the net result
of the Anderson and Robertson cases that an employee has no competent
court in which to enforce his rights. The penalty theory used by theGeorgia court in denying state jurisdiction is questionable, since provisions
for multiple recovery are generally construed as liquidated damages rather
than penalties, the desire being to compensate fully the injured rather than
to punish the wrongdoer.5 The view of the New York court, shared by the
federal court in the Robertson case and according with at least one previous
decision,6 is clearly preferable to an exclusive federal jurisdiction with itsattending disadvantages.' Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, while un-
doubtedly sound in denying the jurisdictional amount to plaintiff," reaches
an unfortunate result in closing the district courts to employee suits R-probably few wage demands would reach $3000. Apparently, this court
would require an allegation of assignment to plaintiff of the rights of the
other similarly situated employees.1o
4. See Sconce v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 3 WAGE & HOUR RE'. 26, 27 (W. D.Mo. 1939); 83 CONG. REC. 9264 (1938) ; Herman, The Adminstratiom and Enforce-ment of the Fair Labor Standards Act (1939) 6 LAW AND CONTEmP. PROB. 368, 387,n. 126; (1940) 3 WAGE & HOUR REP. i00.
5. Brady v. Daly, 175 U. S. 148 (1899) ; Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe-works, 127 Fed. 23 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903), aff'd, 203 U. S. 390 (r9o6) ; Cox v. LykesBrothers, 237 N. Y. 376, 143 N. E. 226 (1924). But see First National Bank of Char-
lotte v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141, 144 (1889).
6. Moreno v. Picardy Mills, Inc., 3 WAGE & HOUR REP. 44 (N. Y. Mun. Ct. 1939),
(1940) 53 HARV. L. REV. 887.
7. "The framers of the Act certainly knew that such controversies almost alwayswould involve small amounts (it is scarcely likely that such a controversy ever wouldinvolve as much as $3ooo.oo). The framers of the Act knew that federal district courtsare held only in a few places, generally remote from the residences of employees. Is itconceivable that Congress intended to give exclusive jurisdiction of such usually smallcases to the federal courts? To suppose that is to suppose that Congress not only didnot use the phrase 'any court of competent jurisdiction', advisedly, but that it intended,in this one particular, largely to nullify the general purpose of the Act." Sconce v.Montgomery Ward & Co., 3 WAGE & HOUR REP. 26, 27 (W. D. Mo. 1939), (1940) 53
HxAv. L. REv. 887.
8. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrcE (1938) § 23.08; Note (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv.lo6, and cases cited therein.
9. The district court of Missouri reached a similar result in Sconce v. MontgomeryWard & Co., 3 WAGE & HOUR REP. 26 (W. D. Mo. 1939), but subsequently withdrewits decision. See (1940) 3 WAGE & HouR REP. 96.
IO. See Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, Inc., 3 WAGE & HOUR REP. 95, 96 (E.
D. Tenn. i94o).
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A seemingly conclusive answer to the enigma is reached by the
Quinones case in granting federal jurisdiction regardless of the amount
involved because the suits arise under an interstate commerce law. 1 This
reasoning also permits suits in state courts, since there is concurrent juris-
diction in actions arising under federal statutes where Congress has imposed
no jurisdictional restrictions.' 2
Municipal Corporations-Ordinance Prohibiting House-to-House
Peddling and Soliciting without Householder's Consent Is Invalid-
A salesman of the defendant company was convicted of having violated a
municipal ordinance which made it a nuisance, punishable as a misdemeanor,
for persons to enter in or upon private residences without the consent of the
occupant for the purpose of soliciting orders for or selling merchandise.'
Held (two justices dissenting), conviction reversed, since such ordinance
was invalid as an unreasonable exercise of the city's police power.2 City of
McAlester v. Grand Union Tea Co., 8 U. S. L. WEEK 318 (Okla. 194o).
The ordinance under consideration is patterned after the ordinance
adopted by the town of Green River, Wyoming, which was declared valid after
much litigation.3 However, subsequent attempts at such regulation have been
less successful. The instant decision is in accord with the rapidly growing
majority which holds such ordinances invalid.- Whereas the city can pro-
ii. United States district courts have original jurisdiction of suits under interstate
commerce laws. 36 STAT. io9i-Io92 (I9II), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (8) (1927) ; Mulford
v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38, 46 (1939). The Act is a valid exercise of the commerce power.
Bowie v. Claiborne, 2 WAGE & HouR REP. 444 (D. Puerto Rico, 1939); Andrews v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 2 WAGE & HouR REP. 503 (N. D. Ill. 1939) ; instant Emer-
son and Quinones cases.
12. Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200 (1924) ; Sec-
ond Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I (1912) ; Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130
(1876).
I. Instant case at 318. The City of McAlester is empowered by statute to define
and abate public nuisances. Ibid.
2. This opinion replaces a prior opinion in which the court held the ordinance to
be valid. McAlester v. Grand Union Tea Co., 7 U. S. L. W=u: Si9 (Okla. 1939).
3. The town of Green River passed an ordinance which stipulated that, "The prac-
tice of going in and upon private residences in the Town of Green River, Wyoming, by
solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants and transient vendors of merchandise,
not having been requested or invited so to do by the owner or owners, . . . for the
purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise, and/or for
the purpose of disposing of and/or peddling or hawking the same, is hereby declared to
be a nuisance, and punishable as such nuisance as a misdemeanor." This ordinance was
held invalid as an unwarranted and arbitrary exercise of police power in Fuller Brush
Co. v. Town of Green River, 6o F. (2d) 613 (D. Wyo. 1932), (1933) 13 B. U. L. REP.
98, (1932) 46 HAgv. L. Ray. 154, (1933) 12 ORE. L. REv. 155. This decision of the
district court was reversed, the ordinance being held valid upon the ground that the fre-
quent calls of solicitors is in fact a nuisance to the occupants of homes. Town of Green
River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. ioth, 1933), 88 A. L. R. 183
(I934), (1934) 19 IowA L. REv. 375, (1934) 18 MINN. L. REv. 475. See also Sawyer,
Federal Restraint on the States' Power to Regulate House-to-House Selling (1934) 6
Rocxy MT. L. R v. 85. This decision was followed in Town of Green River v. Bun-
ger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P. (2d) 456 (1936), which held the ordinance valid as a reasonable
police measure in view of its purpose to prevent the disturbance and annoyance caused
by such solicitors, regardless of whether the thing causing the disturbance was tech-
nically a nuisance.
4. Prior v. White, 132 Fla. I, 18o So. 347 (1938), 23 MINN. L. RLv. 88; Jewel Tea
Co. v. Town of Bel Air, 172 Md. 536, 192 AtL 417 (937); City of Orangeburg v.
Farmer, 181 S. C. 143, 186 S. E. 783 (1936); White v. Town of Culpeper, 172 Va. 63o,
I S. E. (2d) 269 (1939), 26 VA. L. REv. 123. Accord: N. J. Good Humor v. Board of
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hibit selling in public places in the interests of public peace and good order,
5
the decisions of the majority indicate that a city cannot forbid the solicitation
of sales in and about private homes under the guise of suppressing a nui-
sance.6 The pertinent legal dogmas are to the effect that a municipal cor-
poration cannot declare by ordinance a thing to be a nuisance which is not
so in fact; 7 and, an indictment will lie only for a "public" nuisance, as dis-
tinguished from a "private" nuisance (which must be redressed by private
action)8 That such a petty annoyance or disturbance, as caused by the
occasional visit of a peddler or solicitor to a private home, should be classi-
fied as a nuisance and prohibited absolutely without regard to the conduct
of the salesman or whether it was in fact violative of community peace or
welfare seems questionable, and saying that it does not come within the
extremely elastic definition of a public nuisance 9 is only a means of reach-
ing the desired result. As far as the question of nuisance is concerned, the
proposition that--"The sensibilities of old, infirm, or otherwise abnormal
individuals are not allowed to determine whether a nuisance exists" 'Qo_
seems to amply cover the situation. House-to-house solicitation of business
constitutes what has become an ordinary, usual and lawful method of doing
business, and a municipality should not be permitted to exercise its general
police powers to prohibit such a method of doing business which has no
capacity or tendency to injure the public morals, health, safety, or general
welfare of the community.1 Clearly, the dominating force behind the pas-
sage of such prohibitory ordinances has been the desire upon the part of
local shopkeepers in small municipalities to rid themselves of such migratory
competitors 12 who are able to sell their products at lower prices, taking
advantage of the benefits of large-scale distribution, and small overhead cost.
However, the matter of balancing such factors between local merchants and
Com'rs of Borough of Bradley Beach, ii A. (2d) 113 (N. J. 1940) (An ordinance
prohibiting peddling of merchandise within a municipality was not justified as a meas-
ure to insure the "peace and quiet of a residential community" where ordinance ex-
tended to all forms of peddling without regard to whether it was in fact violative of
community peace and quiet, and was not justified as a measure necessary to protect
business and profits of local small merchants, and hence was invalid as an unreasonable
exercise of the police power). Contra: Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65
F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. ioth, 1933); Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58
P. (2d) 456 (1936).
5. 3 McQuurux, MUNICIPAL CORPORaTroNs (2d ed. 1928) § lo65.
6. See note 4 supra. Nor forbid solicitation on the ground of the right of a "resi-
dential community" to "peace and quiet" and the interest of the community in the pro-
tection of the "business and profits" of local storekeepers against the competition thereby
outlawed. N. J. Good Humor v. Board of Com'rs of Borough of Bradley Beach, iiA. (2d) 113 (N. J. 1940).
7. 3 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 956.
8. Id. at § 955.
9. A public nuisance has been defined as follows: "Common or public nuisances
are denominated public wrongs, and are classified as crimes and misdemeanors, since
the damage resulting therefrom is common to the whole community, in general, no one
being able to assign his particular portion of it. Laws in substance define a nuisance
to consist in unlawfully doing an act or in omitting to perform a duty which either
annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, health, repose or safety of the citizen, or
which unlawfully interferes with or tends to obstruct, or in any way render unsafe and
insecure other persons in life or in the use of their property. Such commission or
omission becomes a public nuisance when it affects an entire community or any con-
siderable number of persons." 3 McQuILLnq, op. cit. s"pra note 5, at § 955. See
Prior v. White, 132 Fla. I, 2r, 18o So. 347, 356 (1938).
10. PHILBRICK, PROPERTY (1939) 234.
ii. See note 4 supra.
12. See N. J. Good Humor v. Board of Com'rs of Borough of Bradley Beach, ii
A. (2d) 113, 116 (N. J. 194o). And see (939) 26 VA. L. Ray. 123.
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traveling solicitors is one to be dealt with by taxation. A more desirable
result would be reached if such ordinances were limited to those house-
holders who have in some manner indicated their unwillingness to submit
to such "annoyances", 13 because fundamentally, "the matter of who comes
to one's house is largely one to be regulated by the occupant and not by the
city fathers".1"
Torts-Truthful Defamation Constituting Unfair Competition-
Plaintiff's reputation for integrity and fair dealing as a broker was shat-
tered through the disclosure of his prior criminal record by the defendant
"Better Business Bureaus". Defendants implied the crimes were of a
serious nature, failed to state they had been incurred during plaintiff's youth,
and did not mention plaintiff's subsequent conduct as reformation. Plaintiff
alleged that defendants were motivated entirely by a desire to eliminate
competition, and therefore sued for triple damages under the Sherman Act.1
Defendants contended their action was designed to remove "unscrupulous"
brokers. Held, for defendants, the means used, truthful defamation, and
also the purpose to be attained by the defendants, were lawful. McCann v.
New York Stock Exchange et al., 1o7 F. (2d) 908 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
The court's premise that truthful defamation is unactionable is open to
criticism, even though the decision itself is proper, since it rests upon plain-
tiff's inability to prove his allegations. No cause of action exists under the
Sherman Act for there was no showing that the existence of competition
was being endangered or jeopardized. 2 However, a tort action may still
remain. Certainly none exists in defamation, for here truth is an absolute
defense.3 Yet the court did recognize that the inference from these true
statements, present reprehensible conduct, might be actionable, but that in
the instant case they were not sufficiently misleading.4 Since the purpose of
defendants' publications was evidently designed to drive the plaintiff out of
business, a prina facie case is apparent for "inducing a refusal to deal". 5
However, here the privilege of competition condones defendants' conduct.6
There is no invasion of the realm of "right to privacy" even where this is
recognized, for this right is designed primarily to protect mental suffering,7
rather than pecuniary loss. There still remains the common law action of
unfair competition, which is supposed to regulate practices repugnant to
decent business morality." This cause of action also affords protection to
13. Sawyer, supra note 3, at 105.
14. Fuller Brush Co. v. Town of Green River, 6o F. (2d) 613, 618 (D. Wyo. 1932).
1. 26 STAT. 210 (1890), I5 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1934). Civil actions under the Sher-man Act have been few and relatively unsuccessful, chiefly because of the confusion
still prevalent as to what constitutes an unlawful combination outside the pale of lawfulenterprise. See Note, Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcement (1939) 49 YALE L. J.
284, 296, 298, and in general Note (937) 51 HA.v. L. REv. 694.
2. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. et al. v. United States, 282 U. S. 3o, 42-43
(193o). See Handler, Unfair Competition (1936) 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 214.
3. HA ipm, LAW OF TORTS (1933) § 244; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 6o6.
4. Instant case at 912.
5. See (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 754.
6. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 768. For list of authorities see RESTATEMENT,
TORTS, EXPLANATORY NoTES (Prop. Final Draft No. 6, 1939) 195.
7. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (933) § 277; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 867; War-
ren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (89o) 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 2,3.
8. Dehydro, Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53 F. (2d) 273 (N. D. Okla. 1931). See Hand-
ler, op. cit. supra note 2.
886 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the purchasing public, permitting them to take advantage of superior service
and lower price by preventing the shifting of issues from price to person-
alities.9 Until the present time, true statements have never been considered
an unfair advantage. 10 Nevertheless, in the instant situation it has so oper-
ated, and truth should not constitute a defense when the harm to be pro-
tected against has been caused."- Much of our social system postulates
protection for those men who attempt to rehabilitate themselves after having
digressed. In addition, this proposed broadening is still within our courts'"reasonable man" definitions 12 of unfair competition, and already has been
recognized in France, Germany and Switzerland. 13 If our courts are to
promote honesty and fair dealing 14 and prevent private persons from acting
as "self-constituted censors of business ethics" 15 this result should be at-
tained.
Trusts-Fund in Tentative Trust Reverts to Depositor's Estate
on Simultaneous Death of Depositor and Beneficiary-A mother
deposited her own money in a savings fund account "in trust", in her own
name as trustee, for her son. There was no evidence of an act or declaration
to complete the gift, nor any intimation of revocation. The parties suffered
simultaneous deaths in a common disaster. Held (one judge dissenting),
that the fund remained part of the mother's estate. The beneficiary of a
tentative trust must survive the depositor before title to the fund can vest in
him. McWilliam's Estate, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, March 15, 1940, p.
I, col. 3 (0. C., Phila. 194o).
This court in a recent decision reaffirmed the rule adopted by the
American Law Institute that the death of the beneficiary of a tentative trust
of a savings deposit prior to the death of the depositor terminates the trust.'
Simultaneous deaths of the parties presents a case of first impression in any
jurisdiction. However, the termination of such "trusts" by the prior death
of the beneficiary certainly carries a strong implication that survival of the
beneficiary is a necessary incident to the vesting of title in him. By adopting
both of these results as attributes of tentative trust law, the instant court
becomes the first definitely to assimilate into Pennsylvania law the "testa-
9. See Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement (1938) 47 YALE L.
J. 1304, 1307.
lO. See Nims, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEmARKS (2d ed. 1917) 502.
ii. See Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U. S. 304,
314 (1934) : "New or different practices must be considered as they arise in the light
of the circumstances in which they are employed."
It is acknowledged that truth is no defense when one's right of privacy is invaded.
See note 7 supra.
12. See WALSH, EQUrrY (1930) § 47. An excellent survey of types of practices
considered fair and unfair under the anti-trust acts may be found in I C. C. H. TRADE
REG. SEmv. (1938) 1111 505.30i-36o, 505.4212-4260.
13. See Wolff, note 9 supra, at 1309-12.
14. Nims, op. cit. supra note 1o, at § 7.
15. See Federal Trade Commission v. Wallace, 75 F. (2d) 733, 737 (C. C. A. 8th,
1935).
I. Collopy's Estate, 33 Pa. D. & C. i69 (938). For the stand taken by the Amer-
ican Law Institute, see RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 58, comment b. For general
discussions on the nature of deposits "in trust", or tentative trusts, see I BoGERT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) §47; I ScOTr, THE LAW op TRUSTS (1939)
§ 58 et seq.; Leaphart, The Trust as a Substitute for a Will (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 626. An excellent discussion of the theory of tentative trusts may be found in
Note (1939) 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 847.
RECENT CASES
mentary" theory of tentative trusts. That is, that while there is no trust in
any real sense, there is nevertheless held to be no violation of the statute of
wills.2  Although the terminology of the Supreme Court when it first recog-
nized the tentative trust doctrine in Scanlon's Estate a strongly indicated
express adoption of such a theory,4 subsequent lower court rulings on
various issues have applied a "completed trust" concept to deposits "in
trust" (i. e., that a trust arises subject to an implied power of revocation).5
In Pozzuto's Estate 1 the Superior Court denied that a general revocatory
clause in a will had any effect on a prior "in trust" deposit. In so holding
it was stated that "Here the deposit was 'in trust' and an immediate interest
arose in the donee, subject only to revocation by some unequivocal
act . . .. ,7 This reasoning was later cited with approval by a lower court
in Pennsylvania when deciding that a tentative trust fund was not subject
to an inheritance tax." Again in Kardon v. Willing 9 the Federal District
Court in Pennsylvania, in refusing set-off to a depositor of an "in trust"
account against the closed bank, held that "until . . . revoked either by the
depositor or his creditors it remains in force and the beneficiary retains his
beneficial interest therein". 1° Such expressions tend toward a reversion to
the application of ordinary trust principles in settling litigation over "in
trust" deposits. Since it was the confusion which arose from just such
applications that admittedly led to the promulgation of the tentative trust
doctrine,"1 the anomalous results of the cases decided under settled trust
dogmas 1 2 can perhaps best be avoided by treating the tentative trust as a
2. The majority of the instant court makes its position unmistakably clear in stat-
ing: "A tentative trust is a device created by the courts to meet a new condition which
has arisen with the great growth and development of savings fund accounts. Its use
permits persons of limited means to maintain full control of their savings during their
lifetime and yet pass it on at death to the object of their bounty without the formality
and expense of probate proceedings." (Italics supplied.) Instant case, p. I, col. 3.
3. 313 Pa. 424, 169 At. io6 (1933), (1934) 82 U. or PA. L. REV. 413.
4. The court in the Scanlon case professed to expressly adopt the New York rule
"where litigation of trust bank accounts has been much greater than with us". Id. at
427, 169 Atl. at io8. At this time the famous case of Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112,
71 N. E. 748 (1904), in which the doctrine of tentative trusts had its origin, had been
interpreted by subsequent decisions which left no doubt that New York considered
tentative trusts as testamentary in nature. See, for example, Matter of United States
Trust Co., 117 App. Div. 178, 1o2 N. Y. Supp. 271 (zst Dep't 1907) (beneficiary prede-
ceasing depositor terminates the trust) ; Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137,
112 N. Y. Supp. 529 (2d Dep't i9o8) (creditor of depositor can reach the fund if de-
positor's estate is insufficient).
5. This view has been adopted by most courts. Sturgis v. Citizens' National Bank,
152 Md. 654, 137 Atl. 378 (1927) ; Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455, 168 N. W. 353
(1918) ; Fiocchi v. Smith, 97 At!. 283 (N. J. Ch. 1916) (the language in the Totten
case, where the doctrine originated, leads to this conclusion if not taken in the light of
subsequent New York decisions). Some courts, however, adhere to the inference that
an irrevocable trust is created. Rose v. Osborne, 133 Me. 497, 18o Atl. 315 (935).
Others think that no trust was intended. Hogarth-Swann v. Steele, 2 N. E. (2d) 446
(Mass. 1936).
6. 124 Pa. Super. 93, 188 Atl. 2o9 (1936).
7. Id. at 99, 188 Atl. at 211 (italics supplied).
8. This court squarely raised the issue of the instant case, saying: "The question
involved really turns on whether any interest was created in the cestui que trust in the
lifetime of the trustee . . . the very form of such deposit creates 'an immediate in-
terest . . . in the donee'."
9. 2o F. Supp. 471 (E. D. Pa. 1937).
io. Id. at 473.
II. See Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 125, 71 N. E. 748, 752 (1904).
12. Note (939) 87 U. oF PA. L. Rrv. 847; I Scorr, THE LAw oF TRusTs (939)L 81
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testamentary disposition. Under such treatment, not only have the rights
of depositors' creditors been protected,' which seems to have been the
major objection to the tentative trust doctrine as a violation of wills stat-
utes,' 4 but there is little or no danger of fraudulent claims arising from the
absence of instruments executed in conformity with the formalities of a wills
act. Furthermore, the actual character of the transaction is honestly con-
ceded, and a desirable alternative method of testamentary disposition 's for
persons of limited means is attained.' 6
13. Beakes Dairy Co. v. Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N. Y. Supp. 529 (2d Dep't
i9o8) ; Matter of Reich, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N. Y. Supp. 623 (Surr. Ct. 1933), 81 U.
OF PA. L. Rv. ioIi; cf. Peters v. Goodwin, i9o Ark. 24, 76 S. W. (2d) 98o (1934).
See ScOTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) § 58.5.
14. Note (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 737, 740.
i. "In view, however, of the convenience of this method of disposing of compara-
tively small sums of money without the necessity of resorting to probate proceedings,
there seems to be no sufficiently strong policy to invalidate these trusts." i Scorr, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) § 58.3.
i6. At least one state has given statutory recognition to this form of disposition.
See TEX. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1935) art. 410.
